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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Supreme Court held in Gilmerv. Interstate/ohnson

Lane Corp.' that an employee's agreement to arbitrate employmentrelated disputes may require arbitration of statutory claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' Although
the Supreme Court in Gilmer determined that a person "may agree
to arbitrate statutory claims," this does not mean "that an employer
has a free hand in requiring compulsory arbitration as a condition
of employment."3 Compulsory arbitration differs from a system
under which an employee voluntarily agrees to submit a claim to
arbitration after the dispute arose.4 In fact, the language of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 encourages this form of alternative dispute

resolution for a discrimination claim.' In contrast, compulsory
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2.42 U.S.C. S 621-634 (1994). For a detailed discussion of Gilmer,see Stuart
H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas, Is There a Better Way? CompulsoryArbitration
ofEmployment DiscriminationClaimsAfter Gilmer, 19 EWLOYEE EL. L.J. 197
(1993-94); John A. Gray, Have the FoxesBecome the Guardiansofthe Chickens? The
Post-GilmerLegal Status of PredisputeMandatoryArbitrationas a Condition of
Employment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 113 (1992); Maria C. Whittaker, Gilmer v.
Interstate: Liberal Policy Favoring Arbitration Trammels Policy Against
Employment Discrimination,56 ALB. L. REV. 273 (1992).
3. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479.80 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
4. See id at 1472 (stating that compulsory arbitration does not involve "a
case in which an employee and an employer, in the face of a legal problem, have
made an ad hoc, mutually voluntary decision to pursue arbitration or some other
form of alternative dispute resolution in lieu of formal litigation").
5. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides: "Where appropriate
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arbitration requires an employee, as a condition of employment, to
forego all access to a jury trial and use arbitration in place of a

judicial forum for resolving statutory and contractual claims. For
purposes of this Article, compulsory arbitration is narrowly
defined to identify a situation where an employer requires an
individual, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement
waiving the right to litigate future claims in a judicial forum in

exchange for initial employment, or the opportunity to continue
current employment.6
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation,
mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Act or provisions of Federal law amended by this
title." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081,
reprintedin notes to 42 U.S.C. S 1981 (1994) (emphasis added).
6. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d i182, 1187 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998) (defining compulsory arbitration as "the
system under which employers compel their prospective employees as a
condition of employment to waive their rights to litigate future employmentrelated disputes in a judicial forum"). For an example of a compulsory arbitration
clause, see Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469. In Cole, the employer required the plaintiff to
sign the following "Pre-Dispute Resolution Agreement:"
In consideration of the Company employing you, you and the
Company each agrees that, in the event either party (or its
representatives, successors or assigns) brings an action in a court of
competent jurisdiction relating to your recruitment, employment with,
or termination of employment from the Company, the plaintiff in such
action agrees to waive his, her or its right to a trial by jury, and further
agrees that no demand, request or motion will be made for trial by jury.
In consideration of the Company employing you, you further agree
that in the event that you seek relief in a court of competent
jurisdiction for a dispute covered by this Agreement, the Company
may, at any time within 60 days of the service of your complaint upon
the Company, at its option, require all or part of the dispute to be
arbitrated by one arbitrator in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. You agree that the option to
arbitrate any dispute is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, and
fully enforceable. You understand and agree that, if the Company
exercises its option, any dispute arbitrated will be heard solely by the
arbitrator and not by a court.
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As defined, this Article addresses whether the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 precludes the compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.
Although numerous commentators have addressed the general issue
of compulsory arbitration of employment disputes, 7 this Article
focuses on a detailed examination of the impact of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 in this area. The language of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and the legislative history of the Act8 provides evidence of
Congress' intent to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims, and waiver of the statutory right to judicial relief for future
This pre-dispute resolution Agreement will cover all matters
directly or indirectly related to your recruitment, employment or
termination of employment by the Company; including, but not
limited to, claims involving laws against discrimination whether
brought under federal and/or state law, and/or claims involving coemployees but excluding Workers Compensation Claims.
The right to a trial, and to a trial by jury, is of value.
YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY PRIOR
TO SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. IF SO, TAKE A COPY OF
THIS FORM WITH YOU. HOWEVER, YOU WILL NOT BE
OFFERED EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THIS FORM IS SIGNED AND
RETURNED BY YOU.
7. See, e.g., Robert N. Covington, Employment ArbitrationAfter Gilmer:
Have LaborCourts Come to the UnitedStates?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMW. L.J. 345
(1998); Michael Delikat & Rene Kathawala, Arbitration of Employment
DiscriminationClaims UnderPre-DisputeAgreements Will Gilmer Survive?, 16
HoFSTRA LAB. &EMP. LJ. 83 (1998); John-Paul Motley, CompulsoryArbitration
Agreements in Employment Contractsfrom Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal
Uncertainty and Why Employers Should Chose Not to Use Preemployment
ArbitrationAgreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 687 (1998); Lucille M. Ponte, In the
Shadow of Gilmer: How Post-GilmerLegal Challenges to Pre-DisputeArbitration
AgreementsPointthe Way Towards GreaterFairnessin Employment Arbitration,
12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 359 (1997); Ronald Turner, Compulsory
Arbitrationof Employment DiscriminationClaims with Special Reference to the
ThreeA's-Access,Adjudication, andAcceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231
(1996); Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So-ArbitraryArbitration: Using Title VII
DisparateImpactAnalysis to InvalidateEmployment Contracts That Discriminate,
21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998); Lynne M. Longtin, Comment, The EEOC's
Positionon MandatoryArbitration,67 U. CIN. L. REV. 265 (1998).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
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claims of Title VII discrimination. The language and legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 also indicates that employers
may not require employees, as a condition of employment, to
waive their right to bring future Title VII claims in court.9
Furthermore, the Supreme Court unanimously held in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co."0 that a grievance/arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement providing for the
arbitration of all employment disputes and grievances did not bar
a plaintiff from pursing a Title VII claim and available remedies in
federal court." At the time it enacted Title VII, Congress believed
that "the federal courts would play a unique and indispensable role
in advancing the social policy of deterring workplace
discrimination."' Prior to 1991, the year of the Court's decision in
9. See discussion infra Part IV.

10. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
11. See id. at 56 ("The purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that
Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement
of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal.");
see also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (affirming
that Gardner-Denverestablished the principle "that arbitration [can]not provide
an adequate substitute for [a] judicial proceeding" in protecting the federal
statutory rights provided for in Title VDi); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840
(1976) (extending Gardner-Denverto cover federal employees).
12. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.
1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) ("The private litigant who seeks redress for
his or her injuries vindicates both the deterren[t] and the compensation
objectives of the [anti-discrimination statutes]."); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (declaring that "the federal courts were entrusted
with [the] ultimate enforcement responsibility" for Title VI); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that federal courts should not defer to arbitration of Title VII
claims decided "by the same combination of forces that had long perpetuated
invidious discrimination"); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975) (explaining that judicial relief under Title VII compensates the victim and
also addresses the broader public interest in the deterrence of future
discrimination); Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. at 45 (1974) (explaining Congress'
intent to assign "federal courts [the] plenary powers to secure compliance with
Title VII").
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Gilmer and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts
interpreted the Gardner-Denverdecision as prohibiting any form of
compulsory arbitration for Title VII claims. 3 Although an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement would
preclude a plaintiff from pursuing other state and federal claims in
4
court due to the "liberal federal policy, favoring arbitration,"1
courts interpret Title VII claims differently due to Congress' clear
intent to preclude binding arbitration."5 As consistently interpreted
by the federal courts prior to Gilmer, Congress' intent and the
Court's decision in Gardner-Denverprecluded subjecting Title VII
cases to compulsory arbitration. 6 Finally, compulsory arbitration
13. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.
1994) (stating that "[Gardner-Denver]was widely interpreted as prohibiting any
form of compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims"); see also Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 500 U.S. 930 (1991);
Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989); Rosenfeld v.
Department of Army, 769 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1985) (identifying the "plain
lesson" of Gardner-Denverto be the recognition of Congress' entrustment of the
final resolution of Title VII claims to federal courts). But see Austin v. OwensBrockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that employees can be compelled to submit Title VII and ADA claims to binding
arbitration pursuant to a grievance arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement); cf Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1192 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's
decision for failing to follow Supreme Court precedent, and ignoring the
legislative history to the Civil Rights Act of 1991). One court stated:
Although [Gardner-Denver]involves a collective bargaining agreement,
and not a commercial arbitration agreement under the FAA, this fact
should not change the Court's analysis. The Gardner-DenverCourt was
well aware that federal policy favors arbitration. That decision turned
not on the fact that a collective bargaining arbitration was involved, but
instead on the unique nature of Title VII [claims]
We conclude that in the passage of Title VII it was the congressional
intent that arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention to the
transcendent public interest in the enforcement of Title VII.
Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).
14. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24

(1983).
15. See Utley, 883 F.2d at 187.
16. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
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raises concerns due to the imbalance of bargaining power between
the employer and employee, and the limitations of the arbitration
process.' While arbitration can serve as an effective method for
resolving employment disputes, the process should be reserved for
a truly voluntary agreement when bargained for by a union
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, or between a nonunion employee and employer after a dispute has arisen.
II. ARBITRATION OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AFTER GmER

The year 1991 proved to be a watershed regarding the
arbitration of employment disputes, particularly Title VII claims,
due to the Court's decision in Gilmer and Congress' enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In a series of cases beginning with
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,18 the Court expressed consistent

disapproval of binding arbitration as a method for resolving
statutory employment disputes. 9 When first presented with the
issue of the enforcement of an arbitration clause for a
discrimination claim, the Court unanimously held that a
17. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF LABOR & COMMERCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
29 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS] (on file with The Wayne Law Review). This report quotes
Judith Lichtman, President of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, who expresses
her concern
about the potential for abuse of ADR created by the imbalance of
power between employer and employee, and the resulting unfairness to
employees who, voluntarily or otherwise, submit their disputes to
ADR. These concerns are obvious if the process is controlled
unilaterally by employers, such as when employees are required to sign
mandatory arbitration clauses as a condition of employment ....
Id

18. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
19. See id.; see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc, 450 U.S.
728 (1981); Pierre Levy, Comment, Gilmer Revisited- The JudicialErosion of
Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455, 456 (1996) (stating that the
Court "had generally disfavored binding arbitration as a vehicle for settling noncontractual disputes between an employer and an employee").
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grievance/arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement
providing for the arbitration of all employment disputes did not
bar a plaintiff from pursing a Title VII claim and available remedies
in federal court.20
In Gardner-Denver, the Court reversed the lower court's
summary judgment in favor of the company denying the plaintiff's
claim of racial discrimination under a collective bargaining
agreement. In reversing, the Court distinguished between relief
pursuant to binding arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement, and relief permitted by Title VII.21 The Court
confirmed that judicial review of arbitration is limited,' but stated
that "in instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not
seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he is asserting
a statutory right independent of the arbitration process. "'
Seventeen years later, however, the Court revisited the issue in
Gilmer outside the context of a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court held that an employee's agreement to arbitrate
employment-related disputes may require him to arbitrate statutory
claims under the ADEA because "'[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, [the employee] does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; [the employee] only submits to [his]
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' 24 In so
holding, the Court emphasized that "'so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate [his] statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function. '"' 5 The Court thus appeared to
20. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 59-60.
21.Seeid at 43.

22. See id at 54 (citing the Steelworker's Trilogy: United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel
Workers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)).

23. Id
24. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).

25. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
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depart from its reasoning in Gardner-Denverwithout specifically
overruling its prior decision, indicating that Gardner-Denver
applied to collective-bargaining agreements, but ruling that
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims outside the collectivebargaining context were enforceable unless Congress had precluded
such waivers of judicial remedies.26 While Gilmer can be read as
limiting the Court's aversion to arbitration to the collective
bargaining context, commentators had viewed the Court prior to
Gilmer as being opposed to the arbitration of statutory
employment disputes. "
A. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.
When Robert Gilmer was hired by Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation as Manager of Financial Services in 1981, Interstate
required Gilmer to register as a securities representative with the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as a condition of
employment.28 The NYSE included a clause, Rule 347, in its
registration application and required the applicant to sign Form U4, whereby the applicant agreed to submit any dispute arising out
of his employment with or termination from Interstate/Johnson
Lane to binding arbitration.29 In 1987, the plaintiff was fired at the
age of sixty-two. 30 After first filing a complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit
in federal court, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).31 Relying on Rule 347 of the NYSE
registration application and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
26. See id. at 33-35; Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. 36; see also Levy, supra note 19,
at 457-59 (discussing the relationship between the Court's decisions in Gilmer
and Alexander).
27. See Levy, supranote 19, at 456 n.7; Gray, supra note 2, at 123 n.9; Note,
Statutory Rights and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate in Contracts of
Employment, 66 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 1067, 1072-73 (1993).
28. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 23.
29. See id
30. See id
31. See id at 23-24; see also 29 U.S.C. % 621-634 (1994).
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Interstate sought to compel arbitration.32 In response, the plaintiff
claimed that arbitration under the New York Stock Exchange
Rules impermissibly hurt his ability to effectively pursue and
protect his statutory rights.
First noting the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,33 the
Court stated that the arbitration agreement was not exempt from
coverage under the FAA. 4 The Court rejected the plaintiff's
challenge to the impartiality of arbitrators by finding that the Rules
provided protections against biased arbitrators, and judicial review
under the FAA permitted a court to set aside a decision
demonstrating "partiality or corruption in the arbitrators. " "
Second, the plaintiff argued that he would be unfairly hampered in
his ability to prove discrimination due to the limited discovery
permitted in the arbitration process. The Court rejected this
argument because the NYSE Rules provided for discovery, and the
simplicity, informality, and speed of the arbitration process makes
arbitration a desirable substitute for federal court procedures.36
Third, the plaintiff argued that public knowledge of discrimination,
appellate review, and the development of employment
discrimination law would be damaged because arbitrators are not
required to issue written awards. The Court rejected this argument
because the NYSE Rules required that all arbitration awards be in
writing and published.37 Finally, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's
argument that arbitration failed to provide equitable relief because
the NYSE Rules did not place any restrictions on the type of relief
available.3"
After examining the ADEA to determine whether Congress had
32. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; see also 9 U.S.C. S 1-307 (1994) (discussed
infraPartV).
33. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (recognizing the federal policy
favoring arbitration in a commercial case).
34. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
35. Ia at 30-31 (quoting 9 U.S.C. S 10(b) (1994)).
36. See id-at 31.
37. See id at 31-32.
38. See id at 32.
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expressed an intent to preclude the arbitration of ADEA claims, the
Court stated that nothing in the provisions of the ADEA "or its
legislative history preclude[d] arbitration."39 Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of the EEOC would not be undermined by
enforcement of the arbitration agreement because the agency was
vested with "independent authority to investigate age
discrimination." 4° Based on an implied presumption in favor of
arbitration in the absence of contrary congressional intent, the
Court declared that the arbitration process did not deprive a
claimant of substantive rights.4
The Court also dismissed the plaintiff's challenges to the
arbitration process, and the claim "that arbitration panels [could] be
biased."' Even assuming unequal bargaining power, the parties
"[mIere inequality in bargaining power... [was] not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in
the employment context."43 Despite affirming the policy favoring
arbitration, the Court indicated that it would
not enforce binding
44
arbitration in the case of fraud or coercion.
Although failing to address the similarities or differences
between the ADEA and Title VII, the Court distinguished GardnerDenver on the ground that it involved a collective bargaining
agreement rather than an individual agreement to arbitrate.45 The
Court reasoned that "[alithough all statutory claims may not be
appropriate for arbitration,"" individual agreements to arbitrate
ADEA claims should be interpreted in a similar fashion as other
arbitration agreements, "unless Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."47 Because the plaintiff in Gilmer argued only that
39. Id. at 26.
40. Ia at 28.
41. See id at 26.

42. Id at 30.
43. Id at 33.

44. See id
45. See id at 36.
46. Id. at 26.

47. Id (quoting Mitsubi hi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
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there was an inherent conflict between the ADEA and arbitration,
the Court did not examine the text of the Act or the legislative
history of the ADEA. Thus, the Court affirmed the enforcement
of the requirement to arbitrate age discrimination claims brought
under the ADEA, finding no congressional intent to preclude the
waiver of judicial remedies for such claims or inherent conflict
between the Act's underlying purposes and arbitration. 4' Based on
this reasoning, one may infer from Gilmer that reliance on the
Court's previous decisions interpreting arbitration as being
generally inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII is an
insufficient basis to "show... that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
intended to preclude arbitration of claims under the Act."49 Rather
than relying on a general inconsistency with the purposes of Title
VII and arbitration, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "Congress
intended to preclude" the arbitration of claims under the Act as
demonstrated by the text of the statute and legislative history.'
B. ArbitrationofDiscriminationClaimsAfter Gilmer and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991
Although the Court "declin[ed] to find either fraud or coercion
in" Gilmer, the Court identified them as possible grounds to
challenge the arbitration agreement's validity."1 In addition, a
plaintiff could demonstrate that the text and legislative history of
a statute indicated Congress' intent to preclude the arbitration of
such claims.52
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides: "Where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)).
48. See id

49. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.
1992).

50. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998).
51. Levy, supra note 19, at 459.

52. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-26.
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alternative means of dispute resolution, including... arbitration,
is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title ...

."

Although

Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has termed this
provision "a polite bow to the popularity of 'alternative dispute
resolution, ' " -' some argue that the language of this section evinces
a congressional intent to "encourage" and "authorize" the use of
compulsory arbitration for all employment discrimination claims."5
The Act also provides for jury trials, and compensatory and
punitive damages. 5"
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts
have generally held that plaintiffs who fail to "knowingly" agree to
arbitrate a Title VII claim cannot be required to submit the claim
to binding arbitration. 7 In contrast, however, a plaintiff who
voluntarily initiates binding arbitration of a discrimination claim
isbound by the arbitrator's decision." Despite the provision for the
right to a jury trial in the 1991 Act, federal courts have rejected the
argument that such a provision demonstrates Congress' intent to
53. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081,
reprintedin notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
54. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997).
55. The district courts that have addressed this question are divided. Compare
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 20102 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
precludes compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims under Form U-4), with
EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 504 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (holding that a provision requiring the compulsory arbitration of "Title
VII claims, notwithstanding the legislative history of [the 1991 Act], do[es] not
violate federal law or policy"), and Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 1447, 1457-58 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that the 1991 Act did not preclude
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims despite noting and dismissing

contrary language in the Act's legislative history).
56. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073
(1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

57. See eg., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
58. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[o]nce a claimant submits to the authority of the arbitrator and
pursues arbitration, he cannot suddenly change his mind and assert lack of
authority").
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permit a claimant from avoiding binding arbitration that the
claimant voluntarily initiated. 9 Yet, the voluntary initiation of
binding arbitration and the enforceability of the arbitrator's
decision differs significantly from the enforceability of compulsory
arbitration required as a condition of employment that requires an
employee to forego the statutory right to judicial relief from
discrimination by submitting future claims to binding arbitration.
Despite the Court's apparent limitation of the Gilmer holding
to the specific facts of the case, in recent years the lower courts have
expanded on this ruling, with some commentators arguing that the
rulings in the lower courts following Gilmer have "abrogated
statutory-created employment rights."' ° Following passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, several federal courts found that
compulsory arbitration was permitted under Title VII prior to the
1991 amendments. 61 Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act can be
viewed as simply an amendment to Title VII, it has been argued
that the same reasoning applies so as to not preclude compulsory
arbitration.62 Federal courts have generally compelled arbitration
of a statutory claim when the employee knowingly and voluntarily
signed an agreement to arbitrate employment claims with the
employer.63 Similarly, two decisions arising under the Americans
59. See, e.g., id. at 1441.
60. Levy, supra note 19, at 455; see also Bompey & Pappas, supra note 2, at
201; Gray, supra note 2, at 119.
61. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Ina, 39 F.3d
1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th
Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992);
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Ina, 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
62. See, e.g., Hurst v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 21 F.3d 1113, 1114-15 (9th Cir.
1994) (rejecting the argument that the language of the 1991 Act required a
different result than previous Title VII arbitration cases); Benefits
Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299 (D.C. App. 1994); Lockhart
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. CIV.4.93-2418-GTV, 1994 WL 34870, at *4
(D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the "committee
report[s are] sufficient to establish Congressional intent to preclude a waiver of
... judicial remed[ies] in Title VII cases").
63. See, e.g., Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997)
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with Disabilities Act (ADA), which has an arbitration section
similar to the provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, adopted the
argument that the language of the statute encouraged and
authorized the compulsory arbitration of all employment
discrimination claims." The First Circuit, in a case involving
neither an employment agreement nor a compulsory waiver,
concluded that the explicit language of the ADA allows the
enforcement of a voluntary prospective agreement to arbitrate an
ADA claim against a school.' In the second case, which did involve
an employment contract, the Fifth Circuit enforced a voluntary
arbitration agreement, holding that the plain language of the ADA
refutes the argument that "Congress did not intend for arbitration
clauses to prevent individuals from bringing suit for alleged ADA
violations." 6 It is important to note, however, that the federal
decisions favoring arbitration of Title VII claims were decided prior
to the enactment of the 1991 Amendments, 67 and courts have cited
those decisions as authority without fully considering the impact of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.68

(requiring arbitration of a Title VII claim after the employee signed the back
page of an employment handbook imposing arbitration); Great W. Mortgage
Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997) (compelling arbitration of a sexual
harassment claim when the employee signed an arbitration agreement in the job
application and a detailed arbitration agreement after commencing employment);
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing
arbitration of a Title VII claim pursuant to a compulsory arbitration agreement);
Nghieam, 25 F.3d at 1437 (compelling arbitration of a Title VII claim pursuant to
a provision in an employee handbook).
64. See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Ina, 133 F.3d 141, 148-50 (1st Cir. 1998);
Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1997).
65. See Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 148-50.
66. Miller, 121 F.3d at 218.
67. For example, Alyord v. Dean WitterReynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.
1991), was decided on August 2, 1991.
68. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d
1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994).
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

Congress originally enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in
1925, and then re-enacted and codified it as Title IX of the United
States Code in 1947. The purpose of the FAA "was to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts, and to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as
other contracts."69 The Supreme Court has articulated a clear
standard regarding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement
under the FAA: "Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue."70 The "text of the [Act], its legislative history, or an
'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the [Act's] underlying
purposes will demonstrate the existence of such an intention."71
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."' Section 1 of the FAA, however, provides an important
exception, stating that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. "'
While litigants have argued that section 1 exempts all contracts of
employment that facilitate or affect commerce from the provisions
of section 2, the federal courts of appeals have consistently found
that section 1 of the FAA exempts only the employment contracts
69. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
70. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).

71. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; accordMitsubishi,473 U.S. at 628; see also Block
v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) ("[A]U presumptions

used in interpreting statutes... may be overcome by specific language or specific
legislative history that is a reliable indicator of legislative intent.").
72. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
73. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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of workers engaged in the movement of goods in interstate
74
commerce.

Courts base this interpretation of section 1 on two wellestablished canons of statutory construction. The first states that a
court should "avoid a reading [of statutory language] which renders
some words altogether redundant."75 Based on this canon, extending
the end clause of section 1 ("any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce") to all workers whose employment
has any impact on commerce would render the specific exclusion
for seamen and railroad workers unnecessary.76 If Congress sought
to create a broad exclusion for all employment contracts, Section 1
74. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating that section l's exclusion "covers only those workers actually involved
in the 'flow' of commerce, i.e., those workers responsible for the transportation
and distribution of goods"); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748
(5th Cir. 1996) (stating that section 1 exempts only contracts of employment for
workers actually engaged in the movement of goods and commerce); Asplundlh
Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
section 1 "should be narrowly construed to apply to employment contracts of
seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually engaged in the
movement of goods in interstate commerce"); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery
Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying
section 1 only "to workers employed in the transportation industries"); Erving
v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying
section 1 "only to those actually in the transportation industry"); Dickstein v.
DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (limiting application of section 1 to
employees "involved in, or closely related to, the actual movement of goods in
interstate commerce"); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers of Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953) (applying section
1 only to workers "who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or
foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect
part of it"). But see United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods.,
Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (questioning, in dicta, the narrow
interpretation of section 1).
75. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (citing United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
76. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470; see also Rojas, 87 F.3d at 748 (C'Itis quite
impossible to apply a broad meaning to the term "commerce" in Section 1 and
not rob the rest of the exclusion clause of all significance.'") (quoting Albert v.
National Cash Register Co., 874 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 1994)).
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could have simply stated "nothing herein shall apply to contracts of
employment. " "
The second canon, ejusdem generis, "limits general terms which
follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified." 71 Under
this canon, the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" is limited by the specific terms
preceding it, namely "seamen" and "railroad employees." Thus,
under the rule of ejusdem generis, [it] include[s] only those
other classes of workers who are likewise engaged directly
in commerce, that is, only those other classes of workers
who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or
foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to
be in practical effect part of it.7'
Two Supreme Court decisions also provide support for this
interpretation of the exclusionary clause in section 1 of the FAA.
First, in a case involving the interpretation of section 2 of the FAA,
the Court contrasted the phrase "involving commerce" in section
2 with the term "in commerce" in section 1, stating: "The initial
interpretative question focuses upon the words 'involving
commerce.' These words are broader than the often-found words
of art 'in commerce.' They therefore cover more than '"only
persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce. " ' "'
The Court's analysis thus indicates that section l's exclusion is
limited to those workers actually involved in the "flow" of
77. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471.
78. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936); accord Harrison v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980).
79. Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 598 (quoting Tenney Eng'g, Inc., 207 F.2d at 452).
80. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,273 (1995) (quoting

United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975) (quoting
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974) (defining "in
commerce" as related to the "flow" and defining the "flow" to include "the
generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and

distribution to the consumer"))); see also FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349,
351 (1941).
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commerce, specifically those workers responsible for the
transportation and distribution of goods."1
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Gilmer enforced an
agreement to arbitrate all employment-related claims entered into
as a condition of employment.' Although the Court did not discuss
the scope of section 1 of the FAA, and did not examine the
agreement as an employment contract, the Court's enforcement of
the agreement implies that the Court would likely agree with the
interpretation of section 1 followed by the lower federal courts."
As suggested by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Gilmer, "if the
FAA actually excluded all employment contracts from the
enforcement provisions of the FAA, it would be anomalous to
compel arbitration of Gilmer's employment claims simply because
the arbitration agreement was not formally part of a 'contract for
employment."'' In conflict with this interpretation, one court has
argued that the legislative history of section 1 of the FAA shows a
congressional intent to exclude all contracts of employment from
FAA coverage. 5 Yet under the Court's test for enforcement of an
arbitration agreement pursuant to the FAA, the statutory language
and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 presents a
consistent congressional intent to prohibit the waiver of judicial
remedies and procedures imposed as a condition of employment.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CiVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress principally
focused on overruling hostile Supreme Court decisions in order to
make discrimination claims easier to bring and prove in federal
81. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472.
82. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-25 (1991).
83. See id at 25 n.2.
84. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).

85. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, Panaceaor CorporateTool?: Debunkingthe Supreme Court'sPreference
forBindingArbitration,74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) (analyzing the history of
the FAA and its interpretation).
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courts, and also to substantially increase the available procedural
rights and remedies.8 6 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 had two main
civil rights laws" by
goals. First, Congress "restore[d] . .
"overruling" several 1989 Supreme Court decisions that, in the view
of Congress, represented a narrow and restrictive reading of the
language and purposes of Title VII7 Second, Congress sought to
make it easier to bring and prove such claims, while also increasing
the available remedies in order to fully compensate a plaintiff for
injuries caused by unlawful discrimination, thus providing a right
to compensatory and punitive damages and a jury trial for certain

violations."8
With the passage of the 1991 Act, Congress directed that Title
VII should be read broadly to best effectuate the remedial purposes

of the Act, so that when the statutory terms in Title VII "are
susceptible to alternative interpretations, the courts are to select the
construction which most effectively advances the underlying

congressional purpose [of the Act]."' One of the important
purposes of the 1991 Act was to increase the possible remedies

86. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); West Virginia
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Library of
Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); see alo Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994) (listing the Supreme Court decisions and Congress'
response in the 1991 Act).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(), at 1 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 549; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 250-51 (listing the Supreme Court
decisions); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 102-40(), at 30 (1991);
H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1]), at 1-4 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 69496; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40(, at 72 (emphasizing that juries should decide
the damages issues because "[t~he jury system is the cornerstone of our system of
civil justice, as evidenced by the Seventh Amendment's guarantee").
89. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(, at 88; see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439,
443 (1991) (stating that civil rights statutes should be broadly construed).
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available for a civil rights claimant. 9 As stated by Congress, the
"primary purpose" was "to strengthen existing protections and
remedies available [under Title VII]."91 Based on this language, it
would appear to be "at least a mild paradox"92 to conclude that
Congress "encouraged" compulsory arbitration in which an

employer conditions employment on an employee's surrendering
of the right to a judicial forum for all future discrimination claims.93
Such an interpretation would also be at odds with the other types
of alternative dispute resolution "encouraged" in the Act, including
"settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, [and] mini-trials," which are all consensual.94
Rather than presenting a voluntary option for resolving a
dispute, a compulsory arbitration agreement provides a take-it or
leave-it offer for an applicant or employee, and forces the individual
to either agree to arbitrate any future employment disputes or seek
another job.95 This Hobson's choice directly conflicts with section
118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was intended to aid in

the deterrence of employment discrimination by increasing a
plaintiff's choice of available forums for resolving the dispute rather
than limiting them to one non-judicial option.96 In Gilmer, the
90. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(11), at 1.
92. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997).

93. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 445 (1998).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1081, S 118
(1991), reprintedin notes to 42 U.S.C. S 1981 (1994); see also Babbitt v. Sweet

Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 698 n.11 (1995) (stating that, if possible, a string
of terms in a statute should be read consistently so that they "reflect... the
broad purpose of the Act").
95. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, MandatoryArbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contractof the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1017, 1020 (1996) (stating that "mandatory arbitration is often imposed as a
condition of employment, without any consent or bargaining... [and] [t]hus,
mandatory arbitration agreements operate as the new yellow dog contracts of the
1990s").
96. See Duffleld, 144 F.3d at 1198; cf Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133
F.3d 141, 150 (1st Cir. 1998) (enforcing an arbitration agreement between parents
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Court stated that "[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the
parties should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."97 While federal courts have allowed the enforcement
of compulsory arbitration clauses, it can be argued that the
employee has not "made the bargain to arbitrate" 98 when the clause
is unilaterally imposed by the employer as a condition of
employment.
In contrast to the enforcement of a compulsory arbitration
clause, the legislative history of the 1991 Act does not indicate that
Congress intended to preclude an employee from voluntarily
agreeing to submit a Title VII claim to arbitration after it has arisen.
As the Act indicates, plaintiffs are "encouraged" to resolve an
employment dispute by such a procedure, and if the employee
voluntarily chooses arbitration as an alternative, the employee will
be bound by the arbitrator's decision.99 An employee may thus
independently determine that arbitration is a preferable method for
resolution of the dispute as opposed to lengthy and expensive
litigation.
The EEOC agrees that the language and legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 evidences Congress' express intent to
prohibit the compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims, and
distinguishes Title VII claims after passage of the Act in 1991 from
the pre-1990 ADEA claim found arbitrable by the Court in Gilmer.
While the EEOC supports the use of arbitration as an alternative
method of dispute resolution when there is an existing claim and
the parties voluntarily agree to submit the dispute to arbitration,
the agency opposes the enforcement of arbitration agreements that
and a school for an ADA claim because of its "voluntary" nature, although
suggesting that "involuntary" agreements or an agreement in which an individual
had no "influence over" would be unenforceable).
97. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).

98. Id
99. See Duffeld, 144 F.3d at 1199; Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437,
1440 (9th Cir. 1994).
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require an individual to agree in advance to submit future claims to
arbitration as a condition of initial or continued employment. 1°°
A. The Statutory Language ofthe CivilRights Act of 1991 Encourages
the Use of Voluntary Rather Than Compulsory Arbitration
The text of section 118 first appeared verbatim in the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1990. Both houses of Congress passed the
legislation, but President Bush vetoed the Act due to his concerns
with other provisions. The House Conference Report explained the
effect of the provision by stating that "any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration... in any employment contract, does
not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VIl." 1' Section 118 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 includes identical language to encourage the
voluntary arbitration of discrimination claims, stating:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the
use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Act or provisions of
Federal law amended by this title."0
When interpreting a statute, a court must not be guided by "'a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions
' 3 Furthermore, a
of the whole law, and to its object and policy."'
court should "consider not only the bare meaning of the word, but
100. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of
Employment DiscriminationDisputesas a Condition ofEmployment, No. 915.002
(uly 10, 1997) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.txt>.
101. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-755, at 20 (1990).
102. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Star. 1081, 5 118
(1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

103. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S.
86, 94-95 (1993) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (quoting
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222 (1986))).
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also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme."' °4 In
section 118 of the Act, Congress directly addressed the use of
arbitration for settling Title VII claims, stating that the parties
could, "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,"
choose to pursue alternative methods of dispute resolution,
including arbitration, to settle a Title VII dispute.' The language
in the Act, "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law" provides the section's substantive limitations and must be read
° Therefore,
in the context of the objectives and policies of the Act.'O
a court should presume that Congress' use of the qualifiers "where
appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by law" in section 118
of the Act provide separate and well-defined limitations on the use
of the arbitration process to resolve Title VII claims." At a
minimum, the limiting phrase "where appropriate" refutes the
argument that "to the extent authorized by law" should be
interpreted as an expression of Congress' intent to either encourage
all forms of arbitration or encourage the use of arbitration under all
conditions and circumstances that might otherwise be lawful."°'
Instead, the phrase "where appropriate" should be interpreted as
indicating a Congressional intent to encourage the use of arbitration
for the resolution of discrimination claims only under
circumstances or conditions deemed both legally permissible and
appropriate. Congress' use of the word "encouraged" simply means
that Congress was encouraging parties to arbitrate disputes within
the boundaries contemplated by the Act. It would be a gross
mischaracterization of Congress' intent to interpret the use of the
104. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995).
105. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1081, § 118
(1991), rerintedin notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
106. See id.; JohnHancock, 510 U.S. at 94-95; Duffield v. Robertson Stephens
Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (stating that courts should be "reluctan[t] to
treat statutory terms as surplussage"); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &

Serv. Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 n.11 (1988) (citing cases holding same).
107. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146 ("assum[ing] that Congress used two terms
because it intended each term to have a particular, non-superfluous meaning").
108. See Duffleld, 144 F.3d at 1194.
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word "encourage" as a declaration in favor of arbitration without
regard for the rights of the individual that the Act was created to
protect. 109
Examined in isolation, the phrase "where appropriate" provides
little assistance as to the circumstances Congress deemed arbitration
to be "appropriate." ° The purposes and objectives of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, however, indicate a congressional intent to
expand employees' rights and remedies available under Title VII, so
the phrase "where appropriate" should be interpreted as meaning
when arbitration serves to further goals of the Act to provide
victims of discrimination the opportunity to select a desirable
alternative forum for the claim that provides the full array of
protections and remedies, but not to force an undesirable forum
upon the victim.m
Although the qualifying phrase "to the extent authorized by
law" cannot be precisely defined, it can be interpreted as a
codification of the "law" as Congress understood it at the time the
passage was either drafted or enacted."' Interpretation of such an
imprecise phrase requires initially examining the statute to
determine Congress' perception of the existing law that it was
shaping or reshaping.1 ' At the time Congress drafted section 118
and it was reported out of the House Education and Labor
Committee, courts held compulsory arbitration agreements to
arbitrate Title VII claims to be unenforceable."1 Thus, application
109. See icL at 1193.
110. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 122 (2d ed. 1985) (defining
"appropriate" as "[s]utable for a particular person, condition, occasion, or place;
proper; fitting").
111. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194; see alsoJohnHancock, 510 U.S. at 94-95

(stating that in construing the language of a statute, a court should be guided by
the object and policy of the whole law); United States v. Quails, 140 F.3d 824,

826 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated andremanded, 119 S. Ct. 398 (1998).
112. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194.
113. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988); see also Brown
v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976) (applying this principle to
Title VII amendments).
114. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984);
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of this principle to the qualifying language "to the extent authorized
by law" demonstrates that a compulsory agreement to arbitrate
future Title VII claims is not "authorized by law."
While it must be recognized that the Court adopted a "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements ... ."115 in the nondiscrimination context, this policy in favor of arbitration
agreements was based on the assumption that such an agreement
was a "freely negotiated choice-of-forum clause [ ]. 116 In addition,
the federal courts of appeals, at the time section 118 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 was drafted and reported out of the House
Education and Labor Committee, had, without exception, "widely
interpreted" Title VII as "prohibiting any form of compulsory
arbitration," including individual employment cases. 7 Since the
Court's decision in Gilmer had not yet been decided at the time
section 118 was drafted and set forth by the House Education and
Labor Committee, it can be assumed the state of the law referred to
in the phrase "to the extent authorized by law" reflected the
consensus of the lower courts because the Court had not spoken to
the contrary.118
B. RelationshipBetween Gilmer and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Because the Court decided Gilmer shortly before the official
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
115. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
116. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 631 (1985) (stating that "nothing... prevents a party from excluding
statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate"); see also, e.g.,
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84
(1989) (upholding the enforcement of an arbitration agreement because it
"broadened" the plaintiff's right to choose a forum to resolve the dispute); Volt
Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (stating
"[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion").
117. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994);
see Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194.
118. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180; Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194.
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enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it can be argued that
section 118 of the Act intended to codify the Gilmer decision. It
must be remembered, though, that Gilmer involved the application
and enforcement of an arbitration clause under the ADEA, and did
not address any comparison between Title VII and the ADEA."
While the ADEA and Title VII share similar substantive provisions,
the remedial and procedural provisions of the ADEA were
originally modeled after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 20
rather than Title VLI. 12 Because of the crucial differences between
the two statutes, the Supreme Court has held that an attempt to
divine congressional intent by comparing the ADEA and Title VII
is erroneous." Thus, while the phrase "to the extent authorized by
law" could be read as applicable to the substantive provisions of
Title VII due to the similarities with the ADEA and the Court's
decision in Gilmer, the phrase should be read in the context of the
other qualifying phrase and in light of the objectives and purposes
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, so as to refer to the Gardner-Denver
line of cases rather than Gilmer.2 '
In addition, following the grant of certiorari in Gilmer, 24
Congress amended the ADEA to provide that any waiver of rights
under the Act must be "knowing and voluntary," including the

119. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
120. 29 U.S.C. % 201-219 (1994).
121. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578-84 (1978); see also McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1995) (noting that despite
the enforcement of the ADEA being transferred to the EEOC, the procedural
provisions of the ADEA follow the FLSA, and are distinct from the procedural
provisions for Title VII).
122. See Lorillard,434 U.S. at 584-85.
123. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195.
124. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA) was
passed prior to the Court's decision in Gilmer,but the arbitration agreement in
Gilmerwas not subject to the Act because the claim in the case arose prior to the
enactment of the OWBPA. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101433, 104 Stat. 984, S 202 (1990) (stating that the waiver
provisions of the Act "shall not apply with respect to waivers that occur before

the date of enactment of this Act").
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right to a jury trial.1 The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
of 1990 (OWBPA) was passed to ensure that employees "are not
coerced or manipulated" into waiving their rights under the
ADEA.26 A waiver of "rights or claims that may arise after the date
the waiver is executed" is not considered knowing and voluntary.'
Congress was particularly concerned with the "preemptive waiver
of rights [that] occurs before a dispute has arisen and indeed before
an employee is even aware of any potential or actual pattern of
discrimination."128 This amended language was not considered by
the Court in Gilmer.!29 Furthermore, although Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 after the Court's decision in Gilmer,
Section 118 was drafted and reported out by the House Education
and Labor Committee prior to Gilmer, and repeated verbatim the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 vetoed by President
Bush."0

125. 29 U.S.C. S 626(o (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. S 626c (1994); Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101433, 104 Star. 983,
§ 201 (1990); Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 838, 841 (1998).
Congress stated that the loss of the right to a jury trial was the principal
justification for adopting a limitation on the waiver of ADEA rights. See S. REP.
No. 101-79, at 12-13 (1989).
126. S.REP. No. 101-263, at 5 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509,
1510; see also S. REP. NO. 101-79, at 13; H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 24 (stating that
the OWBPA was passed due to the concern that older workers could be "coerced
into signing away their ADEA protections").
127. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(0(1)(C).
128. S. REP. No. 101-79, at 9, incorporatedby reference in S. REP. No. 101263, at 15, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1520.
129. Although the Court made a passing reference to the OWBPA, it did not

address the effect of the Act on compulsory arbitration agreements. See Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 28-29 n.3. But see Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656,
660 (5th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that the OWBPA should not be interpreted to
cover the waiver of a "judicial forum" because "[tihere is no indication that
Congress intended the OWBPA to affect agreements to arbitrate employment

disputes").
130. Note that there was no Senate Committee Report, although another
House Committee subsequently approved the identical bill without change. See
H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 1 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694.
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C. LegislativeHistoryIndicates an Intent Not to IncorporateGilmer
orAuthorize Compulsory Arbitration
The legislative history for section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 indicates that Congress did not intend to include Gilmer
within the definition of "authorized by law." 3' Instead, Congress
expressed a clear intent not to incorporate the Court's decision in
Gilmer into the amendments to Title VII, or authorize mandatory
arbitration of claims under Title VII.'" Section 118's legislative
history unambiguously demonstrates that Congress' goal was to
codify the law in place at the time section 118 was drafted. In fact,
the floor statements and Committee reports discussing section 118
clearly reflect Congress' intent that in permitting arbitration only
"[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, "133
Congress was adopting the Gardner-Denver precedent, thus
prohibiting the enforcement of a compulsory arbitration clause
governing future Title VII claims, rather than the arguable
131. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1195 (9th
Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998): Note that some courts and scholars
have been critical of using legislative history to discern the meaning of a
statutory provision. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Kozinski, J., concurring); Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 940 F. Supp.
1447, 1457-58 (D. Minn. 1996) ("[Riemarks made by individual members of
Congress during floor debates typically serve as the least reliable form of
legislative history since they not only brim with obvious bias but also remain
subject to continuous amendment and supplementation throughout the
legislative process."); WIAM KEEFE & MORRIS OGUL, THE AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVEPROCESs 258 (5th ed. 1981) ("[D]ebate is... a curious melange of
the opening lines of many speeches never heard on the floor, coupled with
revised, sometimes totally new, remarks."); ANToNIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 29 (1997) (stating it is "the words, rather than the intent of the
legislature, which is the law that must be followed"); Reed Dickerson, Statutory
Interpretation:Diinginto LegislativeHistory; 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 113132 (1983).
132. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195.
133. Id. (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lal., 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir.
1994)).
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34
validation of such an agreement in Gilmer.1
Furthermore, if the
statutory language regarding arbitration is perceived to be
ambiguous, the "unusual force and clarity" of the legislative history
13
should be dispositive regarding this issue. 1
Although it can be argued that the Court's decision in Gilmer
altered the established rules from Gardner-Denverand McDonald v.
City of West Branch,136 two of the cases on which Congress based its
interpretation of the law at the time of the Act's passage, this
argument does not alter Congress' expressed intent in section 118.
As stated by the Court with regard to the 1964 Civil Rights Act,

[w]hether [Congress'] understanding [of the law] was in
some ultimate sense incorrect is not what is important in
determining the legislative intent in amending the 1964
Civil Rights Act. . . . For the relevant inquiry is not
whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the
law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law
was.

137

134. While the reports from the congressional committees do not specifically
mention Gilmer, statements by individual members of the House indicate that
they were familiar with the decision. See 137 CONG. REC. H9548 (daily ed. Nov.
7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde). In discussing section 118, Representative
Hyde stated:
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including binding arbitration, where the parties knowingly
and voluntarily elect to use these methods.
In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the increasing
sophistication and reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no
reason to disfavor the use of such forums.
Id (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)); see also
Levy, supra note 19, at 468 (stating that the legislative history indicates that
Congress was preserving Gardner.Denverrather than codifying any arguable
revisions from Gilmer).
135. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197.
136. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
137. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976) (footnote
omitted); see also Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197 (stating that "[w]hen Congress
codifies the policy of certain of the Court's holdings, we are bound to follow the
dictates of those cases regardless of whether we think they were correctly
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Therefore, as long as the statutory language does not run afoul of
the Constitution, Congress' intent regarding the statutory language
should control. 38
Statements by key members of Congress during the floor
debates provide additional support for this interpretation of section
118, with various members explaining several times that section 118
encouraged arbitration only "where the parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use these methods. " " Of significant importance
is the statement by Representative Edwards, the Chairman of the
House Committee on Education and Labor, who stated on the day
immediately prior to passage of the Act that section 118 was
"intended to be consistent with . . . Gardner-Denver."'4 The
Chairman further stated:
This section contemplates the use of voluntary arbitration
to resolve specific disputes after they have arisen, not
coercive attempts to force employees in advance to forego
statutory rights. No approval whatsoever is intended of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in [Gilmer]...
, or any
1 41
application or extension of it to Title VII.

decided, and regardless of whether they are subsequently limited or overruled").
138. See, e.g., Duffi, 144 F.3d at 1198; Arriaga- Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d
411, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that while a court may be "sympathetic" to
a policy argument contrary to a statutory requirement, "[the court] lack[s] the
legitimate authority to undermine legitimate congressional will").
139. 137 CONG. REC. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole); see also 137 CONG. REC. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Hyde) (explaining that arbitration is only encouraged where "the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect" to submit to the process); H.R. REP. CONF.
REP. No. 101-596, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598

[hereinafter ADA Report] (stating that ADR procedures must be "completely
voluntary;" under "no condition would an arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement or employment contract prevent an individual from
pursuing their rights under the ADA").
140. 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Edwards).
141. Id. No member of Congress argued the contrary view that the bill
would permit preclusive effect to be enforced under a compulsory arbitration
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Adding additional support to this interpretation of the Act,
President Bush stated at the time he signed the Act that "section 118
of the Act encourages voluntary agreements between employers and
employees to rely on alternative mechanisms such as mediation and
arbitration." 42 Furthermore, the Committee Minority Report,
authored by Representative Hyde, indicates that Congress did not
intend to permit agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims as a
condition of employment, stating that, because the Act encouraged
only "voluntary" agreements, it was "nothing more than an empty
promise" to those who wished to encourage arbitration of more
Title VII claims.'43
In deciding arbitration cases, the Court in several decisions has
declared that a court must examine the terms of the statute and "its
legislative history," as well as the underlying purpose of the statute,
in determining whether Congress "'evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies'" under the particular
circumstances at issue.' Thus, in determining whether "'Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum'" for claims
arising under a statute, the intent may be determined by examining
the statutory language or the legislative history, and also by
deciding whether any inherent conflict exists between the statutory
purposes and arbitration. 14 As demonstrated by the legislative
agreement. Note, however, that the Fourth Circuit has concluded that Congress
did not intend to return to the reasoning in Gardner-Denver.See Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir. 1996). But see
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197 n.14 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning).

142. Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1991 No. II PUB
PAPERS 1504, 1505 (Nov. 21, 1991).

143. H. R. Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 78 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.CA.N.
694, 764; see also Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197 n.15 (stating that "[iff the arbitration
provision had been thought to allow ex ante waivers as a condition of
employment, there would have been absolutely no basis for the dissent's
vigorous complaints").
144. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)); accord Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226-27 (1987).

145. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227); accord
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history of the Act, Congress intended to codify the Gardner-Denver
view regarding compulsory arbitration, and thus proscribe the
enforceability of these agreements as related to Title VII claims. 146
In fact, Congress specifically rejected a proposition that would have
permitted the enforcement of compulsory arbitration agreements. 147
As stated by the House Committee, the use of such a compulsory
arbitration agreement would "force American workers to choose
between their jobs and their civil rights." 148 By rejecting the

"Republican" proposal, it is evident that Congress intended to
prohibit the enforcement of an agreement for the compulsory
arbitration of civil rights claims, and instead attempted to
encourage only voluntary agreements which do not require an
applicant for employment to waive the right to bring a
discrimination claim in a judicial forum as a required condition of
employment. 4'
When examining legislative history, "the authoritative source
for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports
Shearson/AmericanExpress, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
146. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1198.
147. See id. at 1198. For example, Congress emphatically rejected a proposal
to allow an employer to require and enforce a compulsory arbitration agreement,

stating:
H.R. 1 includes a provision encouraging the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution to supplement, rather than supplant, the rights and
remedies provided by Title VII. The Republican substitute, however,
encourages the use of such mechanisms "in place of judicial resolution."
Thus, under the latter proposal employers could refuse to hire workers
unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII
complaints. Such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court
decisions holding that workers have the right to go to court, rather than
being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important
statutory and constitutional rights, including equal opportunity rights.
American workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs
and their civil rights.

Id. at 1196 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40(0, at 104 (1991), reprintedin 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 1198 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(, at 104.
149. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 185 (1987).
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on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and collective
understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying the proposed legislation.'"15' This principle should be
followed in a situation such as the 1991 Act where the Committee
reports were published before Congress' vote on the Bill. As
explained by the House Committee on Education and Labor in its
report on H. R. 1, the bill that ultimately became the 1991 Act,
"the purpose of [section 118] was to increase the possible remedies
available to civil rights plaintiffs.""' Furthermore, this explanation
of the intended use of alternative dispute mechanisms in section 118
matches the Conference Report's description of the identical
section in the Civil Rights Act of 1990. The Conference Committee
explained that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration... in an employment contract, does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement
provisions of Title VII."" Based on these statements, Congress thus
intended that the Court's decision in Gardner-Denverprohibiting
mandatory arbitration of claims under Title VII under a collective
bargaining agreement should also apply to compulsory arbitration
under any "employment contract."153
Although a court may disagree with Congress' stated intent, a
court is not free to legislate its own preferences.'-' In determining
whether compulsory arbitration is desirable or should be banned,
150. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen,
396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
151. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
152. H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-755, at 26 (1990).

153. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196 (stating that the Conference Reports
reflect Congress' conclusion "that all such mandatory agreements as conditions
of employment were, at the very least, 'inappropriate,' and thus unenforceable").
154. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 811-12 (1998) (stating

that "[c]ourts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how
alluring the policy arguments for doing so"); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99,

104 (1993) (stating that "[a court's] task is to give effect to the will of Congress
[when] its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms"); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (stating that courts should
follow Congress's intent regarding arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989) (same).
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"the proper venue for resolving that issue remains on the floor of
Congress."" As indicated by the text and legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress sought to provide the right to
a decision by a jury rather than an arbitrator.156 Congress was
concerned with the problem of permitting compensatory and
punitive damages for race discrimination under § 1981, but
disallowing such remedies for other claims of discrimination under
Title VII' As demonstrated by the legislative history of the 1991
Act, Congress sought to make the same remedies available to
plaintiffs under Title VII as to victims claiming race discrimination
under § 1981.58 The House Judiciary Committee agreed that the
"1991 amendments were an attempt to provide parity in remedies
where discrimination other than race exists.""5 9 Similarly, the
House Committee on Education and Labor stated:
Strengthening Title VII's remedial scheme to provide
monetary damages for intentional gender and religious
discrimination is necessary to conform remedies for
intentional gender and religious discrimination to those
currently available to victims of intentional race
discrimination...."0
Deterrence in a public forum, with victims acting as "private
155. Lexecon, Inc. v. MNiberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &Lerach, 118 S.Ct. 956,
964 (1998).
156. See Levy, supra note 19, at 466; see also Roger Clegg, Introduction:A
BrifLegislativeHistory ofthe CivilRightsAct of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994)
(providing a summary of the negotiations leading to the 1991 amendments).
157. See Levy, supra note 19, at 466-467.
158. See Levy, supra note 19, at 467 (citing H.R. REP. NO: 10240 (O, at 6465, 74 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 553, 556, 602-03, 612 (report of the

House Committee on Education and Labor) (stating that in providing for
damages the House applied the "same standards courts have applied under
§1981-)).
159. H. R. REP. NO. 10240 (1U), at 24-30 (1991), rerinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 717-23 (report of the House Committee on the Judiciary).

160. H.R. REP. No. 10240 (1), at 64-65 (1991) (report of the Education and
Labor Committee).
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the
attorneys general" was an important Congressional goals " so
161
Americans.
all
of
"benefit
the
for
statute could be enforced
The text and legislative history of the 1991 amendments
discourages a broad application of the Gilmer rule. As the language
of section 118 indicates, arbitration is "encouraged" as an
"alternative means of dispute resolution" "[w]here appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law," but arbitration is not mandated.' 62
It would be inconsistent for Congress to provide the right to jury
trials and allow for compensatory and punitive damages in one
section of the Act, and in another section of the same statute permit
an employer to impose a compulsory arbitration clause that
detracts from or eliminates those same remedies and procedures." 3
Furthermore, it must be noted that a Title VII plaintiff is bound by
an unfavorable arbitration award after voluntarily initiating an
arbitration proceeding, and is barred from later seeking to litigate
the claim in federal court.' The House Committee on Education
and Labor report supports this interpretation:
The use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is
intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies
provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee
believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or an employment contract, does not preclude
the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII [in
Gardner-Denver]. The Committee does not intend this
161. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 617.
162. PUB. L. No. 102-166, S 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991); see also Levy,

supra note 19, at 468 (stating that "Congress refused, by omission, to compel
arbitration under this section").
163. See Levy, supra note 19, at 468 (stating that "[a] more harmonious
interpretation of the whole of the 1991 amendment shows that Congress

intended for arbitration and jury trials to co-exist, with the right to a jury trial,
if not paramount, than at least fully available to claimants").
164. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1439-41 (9th Cir. 1994).
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rights and remedies that
section to be used to preclude
165
available.
be
otherwise
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Furthermore, the Education and Labor Committee, in opposition
to compulsory arbitration clauses as a condition of employment
and a proposed Republican minority substitute proposal, stated:
The Republican substitute... encourages the use of such
mechanisms 'in place of judicial resolution.' Thus, under the
latter proposal employers could refuse to hire workers
unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to
file Title VII complaints. Such a rule would fly in the face
of Supreme Court decisions holding that workers have the
right to go to court, rather than being forced into
compulsory arbitration, to resolve important statutory and
constitutional rights, including employment opportunity
rights. American workers should not be forced to choose
between their jobs and their civil rights.166
While the Republican minority was more supportive and
"encouraging" of arbitration,' 67 even Republicans avoided an
endorsement of compulsory arbitration by specifically providing
that any agreement to arbitrate must be "knowing and
voluntary."168 While it could be argued that a compulsory
165. H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (W), at 97 (report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor) (citation omitted).
166. H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 104 (report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor) (citations omitted).
167. The minority members of the Education and Labor Committee stated
in the Committee's report: "Both H.R. 1375 [the minority version of the 1991
Civil Rights Act] and H.R. 1 [the House version] contain provisions for
encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Given the
well-known litigation crisis pervading the judicial system, which will be
immeasurably worsened by H.R. 1, there is a desperate need for greater use of
[alternative dispute resolution mechanisms]." H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (), at 156.
168. H.R. RFP. No. 102-40 (1), at 156; see also Levy, supra note 19, at 469

(quoting this section).
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arbitration clause is still a knowing and voluntary agreement on the
part of an employee when imposed as a condition of
employment,169 this argument appears to contradict the plain intent
expressed by members of Congress, including arbitration's most
earnest supporters.1 70 It can be also be argued that Congress, in its
reliance on Gardner-Denver,merely intended to preclude the use of
an adverse arbitration decision as a bar to a Title VII claim in
federal court. The language and quoted material from the legislative
history of the Act, however, indicates that Congress instead
intended that Title VII plaintiffs should have the right to bring a
claim directly in federal court and not be forced to submit to
17 1
compulsory arbitration.
V. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS AND TrrLE VII

The Court's decision in Gilmer does not support the idea that
an arbitration agreement will be enforceable no matter what rights
are waived or what burdens are imposed. 72 For example, an
169. See Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 3:94-CV-1517-R, 1994 WL 803508,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994) (stating that federal law claims could be
"subjected to compulsory arbitration" and that the arbitration procedure did not
deprive a plaintiff of substantive rights because statutory claims were arbitrable
unless Congress "evinced an attention to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue") (citing Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939
F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20,26 (1991))); Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D.
Minn. 1993) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that a unilaterally imposed arbitration
clause was a contract of adhesion).
170. See Levy, supranote 19, at 469 (stating that "[biased on the language of
the statute, as well as both the majority and minority legislative history, courts
should not give effect to an employer's unilateral imposition of a binding
arbitration clause where Title VII rights are at issue").
171. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 n.17
(9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co.,
109 F.3d 354, 364-65 (1997); Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc, 94 F.3d
1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996).
172. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating that "such a holding would be fundamentally at odds with our
understanding of the rights accorded to persons protected by public statutes like
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employer may not condition employment on an employee's

agreement to waive the right to be free from discrimination.173
Conditioning employment on such a waiver would violate Title
VILl 7 4 In a similar fashion, an employer should not be permitted to
require that an employee waive access to a particular forum for the
resolution of discrimination claims as a condition of
employment. 5 While the Court in Gilmer concluded that an
employee who has made use of arbitration as a condition of
employment "effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum," 6 an agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes must still be carefully scrutinized to ensure
procedural and substantive fairness . ' The Court's endorsement of
the ADEA and Title VII"); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the
PrivateArbitrationofPublic-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 644 ("The
Supreme Court in the Gilmer case did not hold that any sort of arbitration
procedure before any manner of arbitrator would be satisfactory in the
adjudication of public rights.").
173. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("[T]here
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII.... Title
VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each
employee be free from discriminatory practices.... [W]aiver of these rights
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII."); Adams
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1995) ("It is the general rule in
this circuit that an employee may not prospectively waive his or her rights under
either Title VII or the ADEA."); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 851 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("'[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under
Title VII.'") (quoting Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 51)).
174. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
175. See id.; see also JEROLD S.AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 144-45
(1983) (preservation of "individual rights requires an accessible legal system for
their protection" and enforcement).
176. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985)).

177. See Gorman, supranote 172, at 645.
[D]espite the strong FAA policy of ordering arbitration hearings and
implementing arbitration awards, minimal standards of procedural
fairness must be satisfied before a civil action may be stayed and
arbitration ordered .

.

.

. [A] federal court, before enforcing an

employer's demand for arbitration under an employment contract,
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arbitration in Gilmer is also based on the- assumption that
"competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators" will be
available. 78 The enforcement of an arbitration clause and the
resulting arbitration decision in the collective bargaining context
significantly differs, however, from the compulsory arbitration of
a statutory claim.
A. ComparingArbitration in the Collective BargainingContext with
CompulsoryArbitration
In the context of collective bargaining and labor/management
relations, arbitration plays an important role for the settlement of
labor disputes, and arbitration agreements are strictly enforced with
little review provided for arbitration decisions. 179 As the Supreme
Court explained in the Steelworkers Trilogy,' ° arbitration serves as
the means for settling labor disputes as part of the collective
bargaining process.8 ' Collective bargaining arbitration also
may-indeed must-scrutinize the agreed-upon or contemplated
arbitration system.
Id
178. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 634).
179. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1473.
180. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960).
181. In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court explained the role of arbitration
for settling labor disputes, the enforcement of arbitration agreements, and the
relationship between an arbitrator and the courts. The Court stated in Warrior
& GulfNavigation:
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here
arbitration is a substitute for industrial strife....
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the
parties.... It calls into being a new common law-the common law of

a particular industry or of a particular plant.
...

The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is

actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.
Warrior& GulfNavigation, 363 U.S. at 578-81 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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provides certain protections to minimize the danger of unfairness
or errors by an arbitrator. For example, unions and employers that
regularly use arbitration for resolving grievances under a collective
bargaining agreement typically are involved in the selection of the
arbitrator, so an arbitrator who is consistently biased in favor of
one side will not be selected again." In addition to simply refusing
to hire a particular arbitrator, the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement can also revise or rewrite the contract in order to correct
perceived errors by an arbitrator."'
In addition, the Court stated:
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express
provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices
of the industry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it.... The parties
expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only
what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining
agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a
particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his
judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.... The

ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he
cannot be similarly informed.
Id at 581-82 (citations & footnotes omitted). The Court stated in American
ManufacturingCo.:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed
to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is
confmed to ascertaining whether the parties seeking arbitration is
making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether
the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving
party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was
his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for.
AmericanMfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
182. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1475; see also Julius G. Getman, LaborArbitration
andDisputeResolution, 88 YALE L. J. 916, 929-30 (1979).
183. See Cole 105 F.3d at 1475; American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Gorman, supranote 172, at
669; Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustic'AJurispmdential
Perspectiveon LaborandEmployment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy
to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1195 (1993).
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Interpreting the terms of the collective bargaining agreement is
the responsibility of the arbitrator, and courts defer to the
arbitrator's award "so long as [the decision] draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement." 1" The arbitrator thus serves
as the designated "reader" of the collective bargaining agreement,
acting as the alter ego for the parties
for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain
is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated
In the absence of
omissions of the initial agreement ....
fraud or an overreaching of authority on the part of the
arbitrator, he is speaking for the parties, and his award is
their contract.... In sum, the arbitrator's award should be
treated as though it were a written stipulation by the parties
setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor
1 85

contract.

184. Enterprse Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. The Court stated that with regard to
the judicial review of an arbitration award
[P]lenary review by a court of the merits would make meaningless the
provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would
almost never is final. . . . [Tihe question of interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the
arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts
have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the
contract is different from his.
Id. at 599.
The Court further found that Judicial deference presumes, however, that:
[Ain arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
any sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's
words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the award.
Id. at 597.
185. Theodore J. St. Antoine, JudicialReview ofLaborArbitrationAwards:
A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel andIts Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1977) (footnote omitted); see also American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 6-7
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Under the FAA, an arbitration award may be vacated on a
number of grounds, including:
(1)Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. (3)Where
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced. (4) Where the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.186
The FAA grounds are not exclusive, however, and in the collective
bargaining context, awards may be set aside when contrary to
"some explicit public policy" that is "well defined and dominant""'
and ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal precedents."188
In fact, arbitration awards have been vacated pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement when the award is inconsistent
with public laws such as Title VU."' Arbitration awards may also
(adopting Professor St. Antoine's analysis).
186. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
187. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)
(quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
188. See id. at 43 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66
(1945)).
189. See e.g., Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
969 F.2d 1436, 1441.42 (3d Cir. 1992) (vacating an arbitration award that granted
reinstatement to an employee fired for sexual harassment of a customer's
employee due to a public policy against harassment and in favor of employer
discipline for harassment by employees prohibiting the reinstatement of an
employee guilty of harassment); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical
Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating an arbitration
award directing reinstatement of an employee who had committed several acts
of harassment founded on the arbitrator's belief that the incidents did not require
immediate discharge and finding that the award was contrary to a public policy

1662

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1619

be vacated by a court if they are in "manifest disregard of the
law." 190
While judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely limited in
the collective bargaining context, such deference may 'be
inappropriate when an employee has been forced to arbitrate a
statutory claim as a condition of employment.' 91 In Gilmer, the
Court assumed that "'[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum,'' 92 and that "'although judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute
at issue."'93 Because of the unique differences between arbitration in
the collective bargaining arena and compulsory arbitration of
against harassment manifested by Title VII and other laws and prevented the
employer from fulfilling its legal duty to prevent sexual harassment in the

workplace).
190. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
For various formulations of this standard, see, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (defining an award as
being in manifest disregard of the law if "(1) the applicable legal principle is
clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators
refused to heed that legal principle"); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975
F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding an award to be in manifest disregard of
the law if the arbitrator deliberately disregards what he or she knows to be the
law); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a
party seeking to set aside an award for manifest disregard of the law must show
that the award is "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so
palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have
made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is
concededly a non-fact").
191. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
192. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26,32 n.4 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
193. Id. (quoting Shearson/Anderson Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 232 (1987)).
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statutory claims in the absence of a union, the principles from the
Steelworkers Trilogy should not be extended to compulsory
arbitration. Application of the presumption in favor of arbitrability
and the extremely limited role of courts developed under the
Trilogy to settings outside the collective bargaining context would
be to separate the doctrine from its supporting justification;
specifically, collective representation of shared employee interests
and joint labor-management negotiation of the terms and
conditions of employment. 94 Scholars have also argued that arbitral
jurisprudence should not be extended from the collective bargaining
area due to the fundamental distinction between contractual and
statutory rights.19 While contractual rights are created, defined and
can be modified by the private parties who are subject to
194. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1475-76; Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of
Employment Dutes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 758 (1990);
Gorman, supranote 172, at 678 ("Given the very different purposes, sources, and
dynamics of grievance arbitration under collective agreements, that model cannot
be imposed unquestioningly upon the post-Gilmer world of public-law
arbitration."); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and OtherFederalEmployment Statutes:
When Is CommercialArbitrationan "AdequateSubstitute for the Courts?, 68 TEx.
L. REV. 509, 511-15 (1990) (comparing the different models of arbitration in
collective bargaining and statutory cases and stressing the important distinctions
when analyzing features of arbitration).
195. As one scholar has argued:
If the award purports to resolve a claim under external law (and hence
preclude relitigation of that claim in any other form), there is a public
interest in the manner in which the external-law norms are articulated
and applied in the arbitral form. Thus,... when arbitrators sit to
adjudicate a dispute governed by external law, there is a tension
between the tradition of limited judicial review of arbitration awards
and the presence of an independent public interest in ensuring that the
law is correctly and consistently being applied, and that substantive
policies reflected in the law are neither under-enforced nor overenforced.
Estreicher, supra note 194, at 777; see also Lamont E.Stallworth & Martin H.
Malin, Conflicts Arising out of Work ForceDiversity, PROC. OF THE 46TH ANN.
MEETING OFTHE NAT'LACAD. oF ARB. 104,119 (1994) (on file with The Wayne
Law Review) ("Many issues of public law require a choice between conflicting
public values, which should be resolved by judges and other officials charged
with lawmaking in the public interest, rather than by private dispute resolvers.").
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arbitration, statutory rights are created, defined and are subject to
modification only by Congress and the courts, thus suggesting the
necessity of a public, rather than private, process to enforce those
statutory rights.'96 In the collective bargaining context, an arbitrator
serves as an agent or "alter ego" for the parties to the agreement, but
an arbitrator who resolves a statutory claim pursuant to a
compulsory arbitration agreement acts as a private judge. 97 In
contrast to a judge, however, an arbitrator is privately rather than
publicly chosen, and is not publicly accountable due to the limited
review and private nature of the arbitration. 9 s
Furthermore, the structural protections for the parties' interests
in the collective bargaining context are not present in cases
involving the compulsory arbitration of a statutory claim.'" With
the arbitration of a labor dispute pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, both the union and the employer regularly participate
in the arbitration process.3° In contrast, while the employer will
likely be familiar with the arbitration process with regard to
compulsory arbitration of an individual statutory claim, the
individual employee is likely a novice, and therefore the employer
has an advantage with regard to the selection of an arbitrator. 20'
196. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
197. See id.; Shell, supra note 194, at 512.
198. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
199. See id
200. See id
201. See, e.g., Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476-77; Reginald Alleyne, Statutory
DiscriminationClaims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the ArbitrationForum, 13
HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 381, 403, 426 (1996) (arguing that "one-shot players" such as
employees are less able to make an informed selection of an arbitrator than
"repeat-player" companies); Julius G. Getman, LaborArbitrationand Dispute
Resolution, 88 YALE LJ. 916, 936 (1979) (same); Gorman, supra note 172, at 656
(same); Lewis Maltby, ParadiseLost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 1, 4-5 (1994) (arguing that an individual employee is disadvantaged in
determining whether a specific arbitrator is neutral due to the lack of financial
resources to research the arbitrator's past decisions); Sternlight, supra note 85, at
685 (arguing that "one-shot players" such as employees are less able to make an
informed selection of an arbitrator than "repeat-player" companies).
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In the collective bargaining context, the lack of public disclosure
of awards is acceptable because the parties to the agreement
monitor such decisions and the awards rarely involve concerns
outside the parties subject to the agreement. In contrast to
arbitration awards which carry little if any precedent outside a
particular company and collective bargaining agreement, the
resolution of a statutory claim in a judicial forum establishes
binding precedent that is published and can be used to support
other claims of statutory violations. Because of the limited
precedential value and publication of arbitrators' decisions, a
compulsory arbitration plaintiff may be prevented from obtaining
the information from other lawsuits necessary to establish a claim
of intentional misconduct or a pattern of discrimination. 2 2 This

problem is further exacerbated by the presentation of a compulsory
arbitration agreement on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis," with terms
dictated by the employer and no union present to negotiate more
favorable terms or aid in the selection of an arbitrator. 203

202. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477; Sternlight, supra note 85, at 686.
203. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477; Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary
ArbitrationoflndividualEmploymentDisputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm 249,

254-55 (1983). Blumrosen states:
In non-unionized private sector employment, there is no organization
analogous to the union to represent employee interests in developing

arbitration procedures. Therefore, the employer and its lawyers have a
comparatively free hand in drafting the details of an arbitration

clause.... Under the circumstances, some employers may seek to
unfairly narrow the legal rights of employees in the arbitration clause.
Ic- (footnote omitted); L.M. Sixel, Case Leads Employers to Rethink Arbitration
Rules, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 557981. Sixel states:
Starting about three years ago, employers trying to avoid big, expensive
lawsuits began forcing their employees to agree to binding arbitration

in order to keep their jobs or get new ones. And many employers
adopted stiff, self-serving arbitration rules that, for example, prohibit

punitive damages or put severe limits on evidence-gathering by
employees.
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B. Concerns Regardingthe Arbitrationof Title VII Claims
Commentators have expressed the concern that arbitrators lack
the competence to analyze and decide the legal issues raised by a
statutory claim because many arbitrators are not lawyers, lack the
training and experience in the required legal analysis performed by
a judge, and do not use appropriate legal precedent."" In fact,
arbitrators in the security industry are not required to strictly
follow the law, are given wide latitude in their interpretation of
legal concepts, are not required to do legal research in reaching
their decisions, are not expected to be experts in discrimination law,
and are instructed that it may be impractical for even one member
of a securities industry arbitration panel to be particularly
204. See Richard H. Block & Elizabeth A. Barasch, PracticalRamifications
ofArbitrationofEmployment DiscriminationClaims, PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U.
44THANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 281 (1991) (footnotes omitted). Block

and Barasch stated:
For instance, arbitrators often cite to and rely extensively on treatises
....

A court is unlikely to rely on a treatise-even... a widely

respected one. Similarly, arbitrators frequently rely on leading cases on
the subject of employment discrimination, .

.

. without citing to

subsequent lower courts or less publicized cases. This means that an
arbitrator's decision may be based on broad stroke principles to the
exclusion of cases more analogous to the claim being decided.
Nor do arbitrators always analyze an intentional discrimination case
within the judicially accepted three-prong framework articulated by the
Supreme Court in Burdine andMcDonnell Douglas.
Id. at 294; see also Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration ofEmployment Discrimination
Cases:An EmpiricalStudy, PROC. OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L.
ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 59, 71-72 (1976) (reporting that at least 16% of

arbitrators have never read any judicial opinions involving Title VII, 40% do not
read advance sheets for recent developments under Title VII, but 50% of those
arbitrators still consider themselves "professionally competent to decide 'legal'
issues in cases involving" employment discrimination despite having never read
a judicial opinion on employment discrimination or advance sheets); C. Evan
Stewart, SecuritiesArbitrationAppeal:An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 KY. LJ., 347,
359 n.57 (1990-1991) (discussing and documenting concern in the securities
industry over arbitrator's lack of training and qualifications in handling complex
statutory cases).
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knowledgeable in the area of employment discrimination law. 25
These concerns are not new or novel. In fact, the Supreme Court
has expressed similar disquietude when hesitating to endorse the
arbitration of statutory claims?' 6 In Gardner-Denver,the Court, in
questioning an arbitrator's competence to decide legal issues, noted
that "the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary
responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved
especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language
205. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 32 n.20, Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 114 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (Mem.).
206. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54-59 (1974)
(holding that grievance arbitration of a discrimination claim does not preclude
the subsequent litigation of Title VII claims or require deferral by a court to the
arbitration award); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,438 (1953) (holding that claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 are not subject to arbitration). In his unanimous
opinion in Gardner-Denver,Justice Powell listed the inadequacies of arbitration
for a Title VII dispute:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual
disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the
final resolution of rights created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first
on the special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the
intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation.
Where the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the
arbitrator must follow the agreement. To be sure, the tension between
contractual and statutory objectives may be mitigated where a
collective-bargaining agreement contains provisions facially similar to
those of Title VII. But other facts may still render arbitral processes
comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection of Title
VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized competence of
arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land .... Moreover, the factflnding process in arbitration usually is not
equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply;
and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are
often severely limited or unavailable.... Indeed, it is the informality of
arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive,
and expeditious means for dispute resolution. The same characteristics,
however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution
of Title VII issues than the federal courts.
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 56-58 (internal citations omitted).
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frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law

concepts," thus concluding that arbitration was an ill-suited
mechanism for the resolution of Title VII claims. 7 The Court
further noted that the arbitrator's authority is limited to
interpreting and applying the parties' intent as expressed in the
collective bargaining agreement, and thus the arbitrator may not

base an award solely upon his or her view of substantive rights
created by a statute.20 8
207. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 54-57. In Gilmer; however, the Supreme
Court appeared to dismiss such "generalized attacks on arbitration" as based "'on
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants'" and "'far out of step with [the]
current strong endorsement'" of arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). In stating a general
rule that statutory claims are subject to binding arbitration outside of the
collective bargaining situation, the Court emphasized that "'[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.'" Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). The Court emphasized that "'[As] so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [a] statutory cause of
action in an arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function.'" Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). As one
court has explained, the Supreme Court "saw a critical distinction in the
situations raised by Gardner-Denverand Gilmer. Gardner-Denver involved
arbitration in the context of collective bargaining, which almost invariably
means that the union controls the presentation of the statutory issue to the
arbitrator." Cole, 105 F. 3d at 1478. The court stated that:
[A]rbitration might not be fair to the individual employee, because an
arbitrator would of necessity be required to deal with the union's
interest... and the union's interests are not necessarily the same as the
employee's interests, especially with respect to a claim of employment
discrimination. Gilmer, on the other hand, raised an individual
employee claim outside the collective bargaining context, so that the
pitfalls seen in Gardner-Denverdid not present themselves in Gilmer.
208. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 53; see also Levy, supra note 19, at 457
(stating that "an arbitrator's authority is limited to giving effect to the intent of
the parties to the arbitration, and.., an arbitrator has no general mandate to
interpret laws that might be in conflict with the bargain between the parties");
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have both

expressed concerns regarding the ability of the arbitration process
to live up to the Court's assumptions with claims involving the
compulsory arbitration of a statutory claim imposed as a condition
of employment. Although the agency favors voluntary arbitration,

the EEOC has consistently opposed the enforcement of
compulsory arbitration clauses imposed as a condition of
employment, and has filed amicus briefs in several cases arguing
that compulsory arbitration clauses should not be enforced. 20

Specifically, the EEOC objects to the following procedures:
[Arbitration] (1) is not governed by the statutory
St. Antoine, supra note 185, at 1143. Discussing the role of an arbitrator in the
collective bargaining context, Professor St. Antoine stated:
If a contract clause... plainly tracks certain statutory language, an
arbitrator is within his rights in inferring that the parties intended their
agreement to be construed in accordance with the statute. Similarly, the
parties may explicitly agree that they will abide by the arbitrator's
interpretation of a statute whose meaning is in dispute between them.
In each of these instances,

Id.

...

technically the arbitrator's award

implements the parties' agreement to be bound by his analysis of the
statute, rather than by the statute itself.

209. EEOC Commissioner Paul Miller has stated: "The problem is
mandatory arbitration clauses that are imposed on employees as a condition of
employment or continuing employment. We basically see these as ways to
circumvent a party's right to file in federal court and their civil rights as set out
by Congress." Margaret A. Jacobs, Firmswith PoliciesRequiringArbitrationAre
Facing Obstacle, WAIL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5; see also EEOC v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic, No. H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19,
1995) (successfully seeking an injunction against the enforcement of a unilaterally
binding arbitration clause in which the employee's continued employment was
conditioned on acceptance); Richard C. Reuben, Two Agencies Review Forced
Arbitration,A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 26 (discussing the case); see also, e.g., Duffield
v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (1998), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct.
445 (1998); Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 105 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Amicus brief filed by EEOC); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad. Inc, 940 F. Supp.
1447 (D. Minn. 1996) (Amicus brief filed by EEOC).
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requirements and standards of Title VII; (2) is conducted by
arbitrators given no training and possessing no expertise in
employment law; (3)routinely does not permit plaintiffs to
receive punitive damages and attorneys fees to which they
would otherwise be entitled under the statutes; and (4)
forces them to pay exorbitant 'forum fees' in the tens of
thousands of dollars, greatly discouraging aggrieved
210
employees from seeking relief.
Adopting a similar view, the National Labor Relations Board has
previously described a compulsory arbitration agreement as an
unfair labor practice. 1
210. Levy, supra note 19, at 478. In an effort to address some of these
concerns, the American Arbitration Association provides the following rules for
the arbitration of an employment dispute. See AMERICAN ARBrrRAT[ON
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT

DISPUTES
(effective June
1,
1996)
< http://www.adr.org/rules/
employment-rules.html> [hereinafter AAA Rules]. Rule 7 provides that the
arbitrator has the "authority to order such discovery, by way of deposition,
interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers
necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute." kZ Rule 32(b)
requires that the "award shall be in writing and shall be signed by a majority of
the arbitrators and shall provide the written reasons for the award unless the
parties agree otherwise." Id Rule 32(c) states "the arbitrator may grant any
remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable, including, but not
limited to, any remedy or relief that would have been available to the parties had
the matter been heard in court." Id Rule 35 provides that a filing fee of $500.00
must be submitted by the initiating parties, subject to final apportionment by
the arbitrator and the award, and an administrative fee of $150.00 per hearing
day must be paid by each party, but the AAA "may, in the event of extreme
hardship on any party, defer or reduce the administrative fees." Id Rule 36
provides that the parties will share equally the expenses of the arbitration,
including required travel and other expenses of the arbitrator, AAA
representatives, and witnesses, unless the parties agree otherwise or the arbitrator
directs otherwise in the award. See id Rule 37 states that the parties are to agree
with the arbitrator on appropriate compensation for the arbitrator's work, but
if the parties cannot agree with the arbitrator, the arbitrator's fee will be set by
AAA. See id Payment of the fee is made through AAA, not directly between the
parties and the arbitrator. See id
211. See Jacobs, supra note 209, at B5 (quoting Rochelle Kentov, Regional
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A serious concern arises when a company requires an employee
to pay all or part of an arbitrator's fee in an effort to discourage the

employee from pursuing a claim. Although arbitration is
frequently touted as an inexpensive process, an arbitrator's fees can
not be characterized as easily affordable. For example, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) identifies $700 per day
as the average arbitrator's fee.' The AAA rules also fail to
prescribe any specific allocation of responsibility for payment of
the arbitrator's fee in an employment dispute. 4 In contrast, the

AAA Labor Arbitration Rules provides that "[u]nless mutually
agreed otherwise, the arbitrator's compensation shall be borne
equally by the parties, in accordance with a fee structure disclosed
in the arbitrator's biographical profiles submitted to the parties."'
JAMS/Endispute arbitrators charge an average of $400 per hour,
but other arbitrator's fees of $500 to $600 per hour are not

Director of NLRB in Tampa, Florida. "[T]he requirement that an employee or
job applicant sign a mandatory arbitration policy is an unfair labor practice, as
is their discharge for not signing"). But see NLRB GeneralCounselReport,January
to September 1995, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 36, at E-6-7 (Feb. 23, 1996)
(suggesting that the Board will only find an unfair labor practice if a compulsory
arbitration agreement inhibits an employee's ability to file charges).
212. See Blumnrosen, supra note 203, at 262 (proposing a model arbitration
clause requiring the employer to pay the arbitrator's fee because "to tax the
employee with the burden of paying for a private judge might seem
overreaching" when the employer is already "avoiding the risk of a jury trial");
Sternlight, supra note 85, at 682-83 (suggesting that an employer could require
the employee to pay the arbitrator's fees as a way to structure the arbitration
clause in order to discourage claims, and noting that "at least when one goes to
court the judge is free"); Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration,Pitfallsfor Consumera,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1994, at 37 (quoting an attorney with arbitration
experience as stating it is a myth "that [arbitration is] cheaper - that is definitely
not true. If you go to trial, you get the judge for free").
213. See Kenneth May, Arbitration:LaborILawyersatABA Seuion DebateRole
ofAmerican ArbitrationAssociation, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at D-16

(Feb. 15, 1996).
214. See A-AA Rules, supra note 210.
215. AMERICAN ARBrTATION ASSOCIATION LABOR ARB]TRATION RULES,
Rule 44 (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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uncommon. 216 The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution estimates
the arbitrator's fee to be $250 to $350 per hour, with fifteen to
forty hours of the arbitrator's time required in a typical
employment dispute case, for a total arbitrator's fee of $3,750 to
$14,000 in an average case.217
If arbitration is to serve as a substitute for a judicial forum,
requiring employees to pay for the service of an arbitrator when
they would never be required to pay for a judge in court conflicts
with Congress' intent to make discrimination claims easier to bring
and prove in federal court. In federal court, both parties may be
required to pay the cost of filing fees and other administrative
expenses, so similar costs would be reasonable and acceptable in the
arbitration process. But note that even when an employee is not
required to pay any part of an arbitrator's fee, arbitration can still
be quite expensive. Under the American Arbitration Association
plan, an employee can be required to pay a filing fee of $500 (as
compared with a $120 filing fee required to pursue a claim in
federal district court), administrative fees of $150 per day, room
rental fees, court reporter fees, and, of course, attorney's fees in the
event the employee hires a private attorney.218 While the filing fee
and other administrative fees may be reduced or deferred in cases
of hardship under AAA Rule 35, when an employee is required to
pay an arbitrator's fee ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day or more
in addition to the administrative and filing fees, as well as the cost
of an attorney, it is unlikely that a plaintiff will be able to afford
pursuing a statutory claim." 9 Requiring an employee to pay an
216. See Alleyne, supra note 201, at 410 n.189; Margaret A. Jacobs, Renting
Justice:RetiredJudges Seize RisingRole in Settling Disputes in aifrnia,WALL ST.
J., July 27, 1996, at Al; David Segal, Have Name Recognition, Will Mediate
Disputes, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1996, at Wash. Bus. 5.
217. See CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EMPLOYMENT ADR: A
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYERS, 5 113 (1995).
218. See AAA Rules, supra note 210.
219. See DAvID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES
IN THE NON-UNION WORKPLACE 291 (1989). Ewing quotes corporate director
of industrial relations at Northrop explaining why Northrop pays arbitrator's
fees: "[W]e bear the cost of the arbitration for the very practical reason that most
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arbitrator's fees, especially when an employee has been fired or
constructively discharged from his or her job, could be
prohibitively expensive and arguably unacceptable because such fees
are not required to pursue a statutory claim in a judicial forum.Y0
When arbitration is mandated by the employer as a condition of
employment, the arbitrator's fees should be born solely by the
employer because the employee would be free to pursue the claim
incourt without paying for the judge's services in the absence of
the compulsory arbitration requirement. " 1 In response to this
contention, some commentators have argued that it would be
erroneous to permit the arbitrator to be paid only by the employer,
due to the danger of the arbitrator favoring the employer in order
to ensure that the arbitrator is selected for future arbitrations.m But
if an arbitrator favors the employer, it would likely occur in order
to curry the employer's favor for future business, rather than
because the employer pays for the services3m Furthermore, if an
of the employees who seek arbitration of their grievances simply couldn't afford
it if we did not." Id; see also Kathryn Cranhold, Solo Legal Arbitrator'sPut
Longtime Leader in a Jam, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1996, availablein 1996 WL WSJ 11805966 (discussing the huge amounts of money involved in the
arbitration business); Jacobs, supra note 209, at Al (same); REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17, at 28 n.5 (capping employee contribution
for costs of arbitration fees and expenses at $50 in cases initiated by employees);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS:
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GAO/HEHS-95-150 at 14 (1995) (noting

that a majority of arbitration plans which address the distribution of
responsibility for an arbitrator's fees either cap the employee's share or provide
for the employer to pay all arbitration costs).
220. See Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir.
1997).

221. See id. at 1484-85.
222. See id. at 1485.
223. See,ag., Mark Berger, CanEmployment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 U.
Mo. KANSAS CITY L. REv. 693, 714 (1993) ("[S]ince employers rather than
individual employees are more likely to have repeat participation in the
employment dispute arbitration process, arbitrators are more likely to rule in
their favor in order to increase their chances of being selected to arbitrate future
claims."); see also, e.g., Alleyne, supranote 201, at 426 (noting the temptation for
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arbitrator systematically favors employers in order to obtain future
business, such a corrupt arbitrator would likely be quickly
identified by plaintiff's lawyers or an agency such as AAA. Note,
however, that a typical employee may not have the funds or
resources to fully check an arbitrator's background and past
decisions, and, unlike judicial decisions, arbitration decisions are
not routinely reported. Furthermore, the employee is being forced
into a forum that generally favors the interests of employers at the
expense of depriving plaintiffs of the specific remedial protections
of federal law. 4
VI. CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court has stated, an agreement to arbitrate
must generally be treated so as to not require the plaintiff to
"forego the substantive rights afforded by [a] statute."" By
an arbitrator to favor the employer's interest); Block and Barasch, supra note
204, at 298 (stating that an arbitrator has a financial interest in pleasing an

employer by either denying the employee's claim or limiting the relief awarded
because the employer may be a frequent user of arbitration); Getman, supranote
201, at 936 (same); Gorman, supra note 172, at 656 (same). See generally Lisa B.
Bingham, EmergingDue Process Concernsin Employment Arbitration:A Look at
Actual Cases, 47 LABoR L.J. 108 (1996) (finding that employees recover less on
their claims against repeat-player companies, defined as companies that use
arbitration more than once in a year, than they do against non-repeat players;
Sternlight, supra note 85, at 685 (citing unpublished study by Professor
Bingham).
224. See Alleyne, supra note 201, at 428 (stating that "statutory
discrimination grievances relegated to ... arbitration forums are virtually assured

employer-favored outcomes," given "the manner of selecting, controlling, and
compensating arbitrators, the privacy of the process and how it catalytically
arouses an arbitrator's desire to be acceptable to one side"); Stuart H. Bompey
& Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later.A Look at Compulsory Arbitrationof
Employment DiscriminationClaimsafter Gilmerv. Interstate/JobmsonLane Corp.,
21 EWPL. REL. L.J. 43 (1995) (encouraging employers to use arbitration because
"employers stand a greater chance of success in arbitration" and are subjected to
"smaller" damage awards).
225. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
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submitting a claim to compulsory arbitration, a plaintiff is not only
foregoing the procedural right to bring a claim in federal court and
seek a jury trial, but also, as a practical matter, potentially waiving
important substantive rights. Although the same substantive rights
to collect compensatory and punitive damages should be available
in an arbitration procedure, an arbitrator may be reluctant to award
such damages due to the adverse incentives caused by the fact that
the arbitrator is selected by the parties, so an arbitrator with a
reputation for awarding high damages to plaintiffs will not likely
be chosen by employers for future arbitrations. Despite some of
these shortcomings, arbitration, if fairly conducted, is not
necessarily inferior to the courts as a method for resolving
employment disputes."' In addition, a grieved employee is
guaranteed a hearing on the merits in arbitration, but no such
guarantee exists in litigation, and few employees are able to meet
the procedural requirements to proceed to trial in federal court."7
At a minimum, the arbitration must provide safeguards to protect
the procedural and substantive rights of the claimant."
614, 628 (1985)).
226. As stated by the Dunlop Commission:
[L]itigation has become a less-than-ideal method of resolving employees'
public law claims.... [E]mployees bringing public law claims in court
must endure long waiting periods as governing agencies and the
overburdened court system struggle to find time to properly investigate
and hear the complaint. Moreover, the average profile of employee
litigants... indicates that lower-wage workers may not fare as well as
higher-wage professionals in the litigation systems; lower-wage workers
are less able to afford the time required to pursue a court complaint, and
are less likely to receive large monetary relief from juries. Finally, the
litigation model of dispute resolution seems to be dominated by "exemployee" complainants, indicating that the litigation system is less
useful to employees who need redress for legitimate complaints, but
also wish to remain in their current jobs.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17, at 30.
227. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1488.
228. The Department of Labor Commission on Future of WorkerManagement Relations ("Dunlop Commission"), chaired by John T. Dunlop, a
former Secretary of Labor and current Professor Emeritus at Harvard
University, provided the following consensus view among employers and
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Despite the enforcement of compulsory arbitration agreements
by federal courts, the trend may be to move towards a system of
voluntary rather than compulsory arbitration. Recently, the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) has voted to
eliminate mandatory arbitration agreements for civil rights claims.
The proposal would implement three important changes: (1)
employees would be permitted to "choose between entering into
private arbitration agreements with their employers, or reserving
the right to file a case in federal or state court for statutory
discrimination claims;" (2) additional procedural protections would
be implemented which follow the standards in the ABA's "Due
Process Protocol;" and (3)the rule change would provide "enhanced
employees regarding arbitration:
If private arbitration is asserted as a legitimate form of private
enforcement of public employment law, these systems must provide: a
neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and understands the
concerns of the parties;
a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure the
necessary information to present his or her claim;
a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and employee to
ensure affordable access to the system for all employees;
the right to independent representation if the employee wants it;
a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation;
a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the
result;
and sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent with
the governing laws.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17, at 30-31. Other committees,
arbitration services, and scholars have suggested similar safeguards. See also
Statement by Professor Samuel Estreicher to the Commission on the Future of
Worker-ManagementRelationsPanelon PrivateDisputeResolution Alternatives,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 188, at D-33 (Sept. 29, 1994); COMMITE ON
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, BAR ASS'N. OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FINAL REPORT ON MODEL RULES FOR THE ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES, 629 (1995); see, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 194, at 791 (asserting that

the arbitrator's written decision, based on a transcript, must conform to the
substantive standards of the statute and award appropriate injunctive or
monetary relief to remedy a violation, and a court should review the award to
ensure such conformity and conclude that findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous).
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disclosure [of the arbitration rules] to employees." n 9 As expressed
by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, such a system of
voluntary arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution should be encouraged.

229. NASD PRESS RELEASE, NASD Proposes Eliminating Mandatory
Arbitration ofEmployment DiscriminationClaimsforRegisteredBrokers, (Aug. 7,
1997) <http://www/nasdaqnews.com/news/pr/nesection97_52.html>; see
also Deborah Lohse, NASD Votes to EndArbitrationRule in Cases ofBias, WALL
STREETJ., Aug. 8, 1977, at B14 (reporting rule change proposal, but highlighting
that "mandatory arbitration is apt to continue, industry experts say, because the
NASD is not forbidding firms from including arbitration requirements in their
employment contracts").

